ABSTRACT In this paper we analyse the well known Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol using FDR, a re nement checker for CSP. We use FDR to discover an attack upon the protocol, which allows an intruder to impersonate another agent. We adapt the protocol, and then use FDR to show that the new protocol is secure, at least for a small system. Finally we prove a result which tells us that if this small system is secure, then so is a system of arbitrary size.
Introduction
In a distributed computer system, it is necessary to have some mechanism whereby a pair of agents can be assured of each other's identity|they should become sure that they really are talking to each other, rather than to an intruder impersonating the other agent. This is the role of an authentication protocol.
In this paper we use the Failures Divergences Re nement Checker (FDR) 11, 5] , a model checker for CSP, to analyse the Needham-Schroeder PublicKey Authentication Protocol 8] . FDR takes as input two CSP processes, a speci cation and an implementation, and tests whether the implementation re nes the speci cation 6]. It has been used to analyse many sorts of systems, including communications protocols 10], distributed databases 12] , and puzzles; we show here how it may be used to analyse security protocols.
We model the agents taking part in the protocol as CSP processes. We also model the most general intruder who can interact with the protocol: the intruder can observe and intercept messages, and so learn information| such as the values of nonces|and then use this information to introduce fake messages into the system. We use FDR to test whether the protocol correctly achieves authentication, and discover an attack upon the protocol, which allows the intruder to imitate an agent A in a run of the protocol with another agent B. This attack was previously reported in 7] .
We then adapt the protocol, and use FDR to show that the new protocol is secure, at least for a small system with a single initiator and a single responder. We then prove that this implies that a system of arbitrary size is secure: we prove that if there were an attack on any system running the protocol, no matter how large, then there would be an attack on this small system. This proof is by hand, rather than being fully automatic; however, we believe that this proof is considerably simpler than a direct proof of the security of an arbitrarily-sized system.
We believe that security protocols provide an excellent subject for analysis using process algebra tools. It is obviously important to get these protocols right, particularly given the increasing commercial and nancial use of the internet. However, many protocols have appeared in the literature only to be later broken. Often the attacks are somewhat subtle and hard to spot|the protocol discussed in this paper appeared 17 years before it was eventually broken. Further, existing formalisms for analysing protocols have not proved very e ective|an incorrect proof of the protocol of this paper has appeared in 2].
The main contributions of this paper are two-fold: (1) a study of how errors may be found in security protocols using a tool such as FDR; and (2) a study of how a protocol, running on a system of arbitrary size, may be veri ed by considering just a single, small system.
The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol 8] aims to establish mutual authentication between an initiator A and a responder B. The protocol uses public key cryptography 4, 9] . Each agent A possesses a public key, denoted K a , which any other agent can obtain from a key server. It also possesses a secret key, K ?1 a , which is the inverse of K a . We will write fmg k for message m encrypted with key k. Any agent can encrypt a message m using A's public key to produce fmg Ka ; only A can decrypt this message, so this ensures secrecy.
The protocol also uses nonces: random numbers generated with the purpose of being used in a single run of the protocol. We denote nonces by N a and N b : the subscripts are intended to denote that the nonces were generated by A and B, respectively.
The complete Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol involves seven steps. However, in this paper we consider a reduced version with only three steps. In the steps we omit, the two agents request and receive each other's public keys from a key server: omitting these steps is equivalent to assuming that each agent initially has the other's public key. There is a well known attack upon the full protocol 3], which allows an intruder to replay old, compromised public keys, because the key delivery messages contain no proof of freshness; however, this attack is easily prevented. The attack we consider in this paper is newer, and more subtle.
The reduced protocol can be described as: 3 Using FDR to nd an attack on the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol
In this section we model the protocol using CSP. We assume that the reader is familiar with CSP, as described in 6]. We model the protocol by de ning CSP processes corresponding to each of the two agents. We also give a CSP description of the most general intruder who can interact with the protocol. We then use the FDR re nement checker to test whether the intruder can successfully attack the protocol.
We assume the existence of the sets Initiator of initiators, Responder of responders, Key of public keys, and Nonce of nonces. We will represent a protocol message of the form: Standard communications in the system will be modelled by the channel comm. We also want to model the fact that the intruder can fake or intercept messages, and so we introduce extra channels fake and intercept.
We declare these channels: channel comm ; fake ; intercept : MSG:
We will ensure that the receiver of a faked message is not aware that it is a fake, and that the sender of an intercepted message is not aware that it is intercepted. We introduce two extra channels, de ning the external interface of the protocol. We represent a request from a user for initiator a to connect with responder b by the event user:a:b; we represent the resulting session by the event session:a:b. We also add channels to represent the state of the agents:
these will be useful in the subsequent analysis of the system. We represent the initiator a thinking it is taking part in a run of the protocol with b by the event I running:a:b, and represent the responder b thinking it is taking part in a run of the protocol with a by the event R running:a:b; we represent the initiator committing to the session by the event I commit:a:b, and represent the responder committing to the session by R commit:a:b.
We declare these channels by: channel user ; session ; I running ; R running ; I commit ; R commit : Initiator:Responder: We will represent a responder with identity a, who has a single nonce n a , by the CSP process INITIATOR(a; n a ). If we want to consider a responder with more than one nonce, then we can compose several such processes, either sequentially or interleaved. Ignoring, for the moment, the possibility of intruder action, the process can be de We can de ne a CSP process representing the responder, similarly.
The intruder
We want to model the intruder as a process that can perform any attack that we would expect a real-world intruder to be able to perform. Thus the intruder should be able to: Overhear and/or intercept any messages being passed in the system; Decrypt messages that are encrypted with his own public key, so as to learn new nonces;
Introduce new messages into the system, using nonces he knows;
Replay any message he has seen (possibly changing plain-text parts), even if he does not understand the contents of the encrypted part. We assume that the intruder is a user of the computer network, and so can take part in normal runs of the protocol, and other agents may initiate runs of the protocol with him. We will de ne the most general (i.e. the most nondeterministic) intruder who can act as above. We consider an intruder with identity I, with public key K i , who initially knows a nonce N i . All of our re nement tests are in the traces model, so|for reasons of e ciency|we de ne the intruder using external choices, where nondeterministic choices might seem more natural.
At any instant, the state of the intruder can be parameterized by the knowledge it has acquired. More precisely, our model of the intruder will be parameterized by the sets m1s, m2s and m3s of message 1s, message 2s and message 3s that it has been unable to decrypt, and the set ns of nonces that it knows.
The intruder can observe messages being passed in the system, possibly intercepting them. If the messages are encrypted with its own key K i , then it can learn new nonces; otherwise it remembers the encrypted component. It can introduce fake messages into the system using nonces that it knows, or by replaying encrypted components that it has been unable to decrypt. This is captured by the following (rather long, but reasonably uniform) CSP de nition We can use FDR to test whether the protocol correctly authenticates the two agents. FDR takes as two inputs, a speci cation and an implementation, and test whether the implementation re nes the speci cation. In this paper we are working in the traces model of CSP 6], so checking for re nement amounts to testing whether each trace of the implementation is also a trace of the speci cation.
To test whether the protocol correctly authenticates the responder, we need to nd a speci cation that allows only those traces where the initia- = AI 0 jjj RUN( n A 2 ): 3 Our notation di ers a little from 6]: we write P j A ]j Q for the parallel composition of P and Q, synchronizing on the set of events A; we write fjc 1 ; : : : ; cnj g for the set of all communications over channels c 1 ; : : : ; cn. 4 The FDR input les used for this case study can be obtained from URL http:
//www.comlab.ox.ac.uk/oucl/users/gavin.lowe/Security/NSPKP/index.html.
FDR can be used to discover that SY STEM does not re ne AI. We can rewrite this attack as follows. The attack consists of the interleaving of two runs, which we write as and . (We use the term run for a particular instance of the protocol; we use the term attack, for any sequence of events leading to a breach of security.) In run , A tries to establish a session with I, while in run , the intruder impersonates A to establish a false session with B. We write, for example, :2 to represent message 2 of run ; we write I(A) to represent the intruder imitating A. In message :1, A tries to establish a session with I, sending the none N a encrypted with I's key. In message :1, the intruder imitates A to start a run of the protocol with B, sending the same nonce N a . B responds by choosing a new nonce N b , and returning it in message :2. The intruder cannot decrypt this message to obtain N b , but instead uses A as an oracle, by replaying this message in message :2; note that this message is of the form expected by A in run . A decrypts the message to obtain N b , and returns this to I in message :3. I can then decrypt this message to obtain N b , which he returns to B in message :3, thus completing run of the protocol. Hence B believes that he has correctly carried out a run of the protocol with A.
A corrected protocol
It is easy to adapt the protocol to prevent the attack found above; we simply include the identity of the responder within the encrypted part of and the intruder can not successfully replay this in message :2, because A is expecting a message containing I's identity.
We may adapt our CSP representation of the protocol and the intruder. FDR then fails to nd any attacks on the protocol in the case where the initiator A and responder B each have a single nonce, and so can take part in a single run of the protocol. We conclude that the protocol is safe, at least for this small system.
The question remains, though: is a more general system safe from attack? If the agents had more nonces, could the intruder obtain enough knowledge from several runs to be able to attack the protocol? How about if there were more than just the two honest agents involved? Or how about if the same agent could act both as initiator and responder?
These kind of questions arise in many model checking problems, and are not unique to the area of security protocols. We may typically use a tool to verify a small system of xed size; but this does not necessarily tell us that larger systems are also correct. One solution is to prove|by some method|that if a system of arbitrary size were incorrect, then this would imply that the small system were also incorrect. Following this idea, in Section 6 we prove that if there were an attack on a more general system running the Needham-Schroeder protocol, then there would be an attack on the small system we considered above. But rst, we de ne some notation, and prove a useful result concerning the way in which an intruder responds to a nonce challenge. We adopt a very general setting, so that our results may be applicable to a wide class of protocols. where C ranges over the set Agent of agent names, k over the set Key of keys, and N over the set Nonce of nonces. We take the concatenation operator \:" to be associative. For each key k, we assume the existence of an inverse k ?1 , such that a message encrypted with k can be decrypted with k ?1 : in symmetric crypto-systems, each key is its own inverse; in public key systems, the public and secret keys are inverses.
We 
B`m^B`k ) B`fmg k ; (4) B`fmg k^B`k ?1 ) B`m:
If the intruder has already seen message m (i.e. m 2 B) then he can produce that message (rule 1). If he can produce both halves of a concatenated message, then he can produce the entier message (rule 2), and vice versa (rule 3). If he can produce a message m and a key k, then he can encrypt m with k (rule 4). If we can produce an encrypted message and the corresponding decrypting key, then he can decrypt the message (rule 5).
We also write B 6`m for : (B`m).
We state a few lemmas about the`relation that will prove useful. These may be proved by rule induction. 
Traces
We let RunId be the space of run identi ers, ranged over by , , etc. We de ne a message number to be a (run identi er, natural number) pair.
MsgNo b = RunId N:
We write :i for message i of run .
As above, we will write I(A) to represent the intruder imitating agent A. We make the assumption that when an honest agent introduces a new nonce into a run of the protocol, the nonce really is freshly chosen; this means that the agent will introduce di erent nonces into di erent runs, that no other honest agent will introduce the same nonce, and that the intruder does not initially know the value of the nonce. We term this assumption the nonce assumption.
Intruders
We assume that the intruder has some initial knowledge, which may be represented by a set of atoms IK 0 . This will normally include the identities of all agents in the system, all the public keys, and I's own secret key. We 
Nonce challenges
We now prove a result concerning the way in which an intruder meets a nonce challenge. We make some additional assumptions about the protocol in question:
The encrypted parts of di erently numbered messages in the protocol are textually distinct: if M i is a valid message i, and M j is a valid message j, and M i contains fMg k and M j contains fMg k then i = j.
Thus it is always possible to tell which message an encrypted part comes from; this means, for example, that the intruder cannot replay some encrypted text taken from a message 1, and have it interpreted as a message 2. All runs of the protocol have essentially the same form. The intruder does not learn any additional keys during a trace: if k 2 knowledge-aftertr then k 2 IK 0 .
Note that the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol satis es these assumptions: that the intruder does not learn any additional keys during a trace follows from the fact that that secret keys are never passed during the protocol (this can be proved formally using Lemma 4). have the same message number, i.e. l = m; hence 6 = . Either = or 6 = ; we show that the latter case leads to a contradiction. So suppose that 6 = . By the nonce assumption, N must have been introduced into run by the intruder, say in message :n (n < l). By the assumption that all runs take the same form, message :n must also contain N. But this contradicts the assumption that N was introduced into in message :l.
Hence we have that = . Message :m precedes :j and contains N, and so must be :i. Collecting all the above information gives us case 2. 2 6 Verifying systems of arbitrary size
In this section we show that if there is an attack upon a system of arbitrary size running the corrected protocol given in Section 4, then there is an attack upon the small system described above, with a single initiator A and a single responder B, each of which has a single nonce, and so can carry out a single run of the protocol. The proofs proceed by considering a run leading to a failure of authentication, and considering how many extra runs are needed for the intruder to learn any additional information it uses.
Attacks upon the initiator
In this section we show that if the intruder may imitate the responder to attack the initiator in a system of arbitrary size, then there is a similar attack upon the small system described above. Note that the intruder only needs to produce Messages 1 and 3 in this run, so the only additional runs necessary are those that are needed in order for the intruder to learn something that it sends in one of these messages. In fact, in this case, we have shown that if there were an attack, it would be of the above form; but the above does not lead to any error of authentication; we may deduce that there is no such attack on the system| even without the aid of FDR.
Summary
Above we showed that in order to discover an attack upon the protocol, it is enough to consider a system with a single initiator and responder, each with a single nonce.
We now prove a similar result concerning the intruder: it is enough to consider an intruder with a single identity, I say, and a single public key, K i say. Thus, two intruders working together are no more powerful than a single intruder. Further, it is enough to consider an intruder who initially knows a single nonce, N i say.
We make the assumption that the honest agents act the same way regardless of the actual values of nonces introduced by other agents; we term this data independence.
Suppose, then, that there is a successful attack where the intruder uses more than one identity, more than one public key, and/or more than one nonce. Consider the attack where each intruder's identity is renamed to I, each intruder's key is renamed to K i , and each intruder's nonce is renamed to N i . Then, by the data independence assumption, each run proceeds as before. Further, at each stage or the new attack, the intruder's knowledge is related to his knowledge at the corresponding stage of the original attack, in the obvious way, i.e. by the above renaming (this can be proved formally from the de nition of the`relation). Thus the intruder is able to produce all of his messages in the new attack. Hence the new attack is indeed successful, and is made by an attacker with a single identity, single public key, and single nonce.
Putting together all these results, we deduce that if there is an attack on a system running the protocol, we would have found it by applying FDR to the small system in Section 4. Hence the protocol is secure.
Conclusion
In this paper we have used the Failures Divergences Re nement Checker for CSP to analyse the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol. We have encoded the protocol and an intruder in CSP, and used FDR to discover a security aw. We have adapted the protocol to remove this aw, and used FDR to verify that there are no attacks upon a small system running the protocol. We then proved that this was enough to prove that there are no attacks upon a more general system.
We should be clear as to precisely what we have proved. We have proved that the protocol in Section 4 is secure subject to the assumptions we have made about the method of encryption used, encapsulated in the de nition of the`relation. We have assumed that the encryption used is reasonable, in that the intruder is unable to guess the values of keys it does not know. Further, we assume that secret keys are indeed kept secret. We have also assumed that the intruder may not alter an encrypted message before replaying it (unless the message is encrypted using the intruder's key). However, if Cipher Block Chaining is used (see e.g. 14]) then (subject to certain assumptions) it is possible to split an encrypted message into encrypted sub-messages; using the notation of this paper: B`fm 1 :m 2 g k ) B`fm 1 g k^B`f m 2 g k :
Thus, our proof in not valid in this case. See 1] for examples of attacks upon protocols using CBC.
We believe that this method of analyzing security protocols is very practical. Encoding the protocol and the intruder in CSP is normally straightforward. And the tests using FDR are fast, typically taking less than two minutes. The proof that the security of a small system implies the security of an arbitrarily-sized system is by hand, rather than being fully automatic.
However, we believe that this proof is considerably simpler than a direct proof of the security of an arbitrarily-sized system: we e ectively prove the general form an attack must take, and use FDR to do the tedious checking of details.
We intend to analyse more protocols using this approach. In particular, we would like to produce more lemmas and theorems that are useful in proving results concerning the size of system it is necessary to consider in order to be sure that there are no attacks upon a protocol; eventually, we hope to identify properties of protocols (concerning, for example, the number of nonce challenges) that are enough to give us such results directly.
